Herghelegiu C. The political economy of non-tariff measures. World Econ. 2018;41:262–286. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12582
Khoa,Nguyen Ngoc Dang
March 27(Wed.), 2019 12:00-13:00
Seminar room 406, Graduate School of International Agricultural Technology
6. Main contents
○ Over the last decades, multilateral and regional trade negotiations have led to massive liberalisationthrough tariff reductions. As a result, attention has shifted towards non-tariff measures NTMs),which are more diverse and complex policy instruments. The main objective of early measures (e.g., quotas, anti-dumping duties) was to replace tariff protection (Anderson & Schmitt, 2003;Baldwin, 1984). Over the years, globalisation has been associated with greater interdependency among States and new types of NTMs have proliferated in response to public policy objectivesn(i.e., health and safety of consumers, environmental protection). However, the same NTMs may be used to pursue both legitimate and protectionist goals and the boundary between the different motivations is very thin.
○ This paper focused on developing countries because NTMs are commonly used by these countries. Also for comparision, 2 developed countries cases were analyzed.
○ This paper studies the political economy determinants of NTMs in developing countries. Two channels are
considered. First, we explore the substitution between tariffs and NTMs. Second, we analyse the role of transnational lobbying in the adoption of NTMs at the national level.
○ Linear probability model (LPM)
○ NTMs are rather substitutes for tariff protection, even after controlling for product and country fixed effects and other variables at the product and industry level for each country. Overall, the results point to protectionist intentions.
behind the adoption of NTMs.
○ Attending at least one MC during the period 1996 –2011 significantly increases the probability of adopting NTMs.